For the second time since the start of the Ukraine-Russia War, Russia has modified its nuclear rules of engagement, lowering the conditions under which nuclear weapons would be used to counter a given threat. Predictably, this threat has
resulted in alarm across Europe, the U.S., and our extended allies. However, unlike Putin's nuclear threats at the start of the Ukraine invasion in 2022, which effectively delayed the flow of NATO weapons to bolster Ukraine's defense, the U.S. and our allies, Britain and France in particular, are providing more weapons and more authorization for weapons to strike targets inside Russia.
The West is not seeking to de-escalate the situation. Instead, we are calling Putin's bluff. Ratcheting up Ukraine's offensive and defense capabilities in a calculated brinkmanship, setting the table for expected peace negotiations that the incoming Trump Administration has signaled will begin in January. What could possibly go wrong until then? Other than the start of World War 3!
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A Survivors Guide to Nuclear War. click HERE
Back to our regularly scheduled discussion …
So, how did this spiral of escalation begin?
At just over 1000 days of fighting, the Ukraine-Russia is taking an incredible toll on both sides. Russia will likely close the year with nearly 800,00 killed and wounded. Ukraine will have losses under half of their Russian counterparts at almost 350,000. This is a brutal conflict reminiscent of the trench warfare of World War 1 than a modern war, with troops fighting for feet and yards each day over a front nearly 600 miles long.
Despite its superior military performance, Ukraine has one-fourth of Russia's population and cannot continue to sustain these losses. Until recently, Ukraine's rapid adoptions of asymmetric drone warfare on land and sea have held off Russian forces. For example, Ukraine's stealth drone ships have damaged 22 and destroyed 13 ships in Russia's Black Sea fleet. Unfortunately, the tide changed against Ukraine this summer when Russia launched a massive offensive that forced Ukraine to cede land or be overwhelmed. Only more Western weapons and the permission to use them deeper into Russia to target airbases, weapons depots, transport, and troup marshaling areas can give Ukraine a degree of relief from Russian brute force direct assaults.
As for Russia, both manpower and economics are working against them. On the economic side, Russia's economy would have collapsed under the West's financial and technology embargo if not for the support of China. However, the Chinese expect payment. They have their own post-COVID economic problems. If oil prices fall, as they surely will when the new Trump Administration energy policy ( drill baby drill) starts in January 2025, Russia will face falling oil revenue and an eventual financial default later next year.
Russia's military manpower issue is no better than Ukraine's. The Russian Army is rife with desertion, so much so that Russia requested a contingent of 10,000 troops from North Korea. By October 2024, the North Korean troops began marshaling in the Kursk area, where Ukraine staged a 2nd front in the war in July 2024 to relieve pressure from the main front. For the first time since World War 2, Russia had been invaded. Putin could not afford to move troops from the primary front – hence the 10,00 North Koreans arriving for a counter-assault to oust the Ukrainian forces from Russian territory.
The Latest Round Escalation in the Ukraine-Russia War – It's Been A Busy Week!
The Biden Administration and our NATO Allies agreed that thet North Korean troops represented an escalation in fighting that could not go unchecked. On Sunday,
November 17, For the first time since the war started, President Biden removed the restriction of using U.S. weapons inside Russia and authorized the weapons release of U.S. Army ATACMS for the Kursk region where the North Korean troops are staged. The UK and France immediately followed the U.S. lead and approved the release of UK Storm Shadow and French SCALP cruise missiles for similar use.
These missiles represent a serious threat to Russia. Rusian S300/400 air defense systems which have proved ineffective in defending Iran against Israel. (see A Lesson In Deterrence: The Israeli Strikes Against Iran's Air Defenses HERE) Russia clearly understood that it had little chance to defend against the
U.S. Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) they now face. The ATACMS is a highly accurate short-range ballistic missile that travels at Mach 3, has a range of 190 miles, and can carry a single 472 lb warhead or disburse several hundred M74 bomblets (smart mines).
Ukraine didn't hesitate to put these new weapons to use, setting off a series of strikes and counter-stikes, escalating tensions to a new height in the Ukraine-Russia war. Here is a blow-by-blow timeline:
Monday, November 18: Ukraine launches a salvo of 8 ATACMS targeting North Korean troops in the Kursk region. The attack destroyed a major arsenal of logistics center and killed or wounded an unreported number of North Korean Troops, including severely injuring a North Korean General.
Tuesday, November 19: Putin signs a new version of "Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence," Russia's nuclear doctrine and rules of engagement. The new document spells out conditions under which Putin could use a nuclear option in response to a conventional strike, essentially threatening the West with nuclear retribution for Ukraine's conventional strikes on Russia. ALARM BELLS RANG EVERYWHERE – but the West did not back down
Wednesday, November 20: Ukraine fires a 12 UK Storm Shadow cruise missile salvo at the Russian village of Marino in the Kursk region. The exact nature of the target(s) in Marino is unknown. Later that day, President Biden approved the use of smart mines by Ukraine. These are believed to be M74 antipersonnel mines, which can be launched on ATACMS missiles and are an ideal weapon to blunt an enemy's assault.
Friday, November 22: Russia counters the Ukraine attack by launching what the Pentagon has identified as a new experimental intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missile (IRBM) known as "Oreshnik", or Hazel Tree, armed with a MIRV- Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle warhead at the Ukrainian city of Dnipro. The MIRV warheads were conventionally armed, hitting multiple targets in Dnipro but causing little damage. The attack was designed to send a message – "Back Off!" Putin later announced that Russia had additional "Oreshnik" experimental weapons and would use them if necessary.
The launch of "Oreshnik" likely caused a nuclear launch warning FLASH message from U.S. Strategic Command to U.S and NATO forces. A ballistic missile launch generates a massive thermal plume immediately detected by U.S. early-warning thermal imaging satellites. Depending on the location of the launch and initial missile course prediction, a set of regional air defense systems (combined radar & missile interceptor batteries) are provided initial target parameters to track the incoming missile(s) and determine which missile defense assets should engage the target. Given the Friday missile strike was from Russia and targeted a location in Central Europe, the following U.S. / NATO missile defense system would have immediately activated and tracked the incoming missile:
The U.S. BMD – Ballistic Missile Defense radar at Kürecik, Türkiye
U.S. Aegis Ashore site at Deveselu Air Base, Romania
U.S. Aegis Ashore site at the Redzikowo military base, Poland
Within seconds, these systems would have identified the Dnipro area as the target. The U.S/NATO likely warned Ukraine but could not engage this lone missile with their powerful AGEIS US Navy SM3-IIB antiballistic interceptors – NATO cannot provide direct support to Ukraine. Make no mistake, the SM3-IIB could have knocked this missile out of the sky, as it has done dozens of times against Iran's ballistic and hypersonic missile attacks on Israel. It does, however, take a salvo of 2 to 4 interceptors to hit hypersonic targets and achieve a high probability of a kill. This has the knock-on effect of depleting the supply of interceptors and possibly overwhelm the air defense system.
Unable to respond, NATO and U.S. command had to sit and watch this attack play out. Here is the problem: A hypersonic IRBM strikes its target in a handful of minutes or less. There is no way to detect if a Russian ICBM or IRBM is armed with nuclear or conventional warheads until the MIRVWarheads hit their target. For a few minutes, the soldiers engaged in the U.S. / NATO missile defense centers had to face the possibility that this was indeed a nuclear missile and World War III was about to start. SOBERING – VERY DAMN SOBERING. In the end, It was a conventional strike. As you would expect, the Pentagon downplayed this attack in their briefings and engagement with the general public. However, for a few minutes on Friday, November 22nd, that was how the whole thing went down.
Over the next days and weeks, further provocations and escalations will likely occur on both sides. We have to hold tight and see how this plays out.
This entire situation begs the question, what would trigger the U.S. to engage in Nuclear war? To answer that, let's look at a section of my upcoming book:
How the Hell Did We Get Here?
A Citizens' Guide to thet New Cold War and Rebuilding Deterrenc
The book goes on Pre-sale on Monday, December 2nd
Join my "Dystopic" newsletter to find out more HERE
The Rules of Engagement
So, when would the U.S. use nuclear weapons? Is there a list of conditions? What guides the U.S. Military and the President? Given that deterrence relies on our enemy's understanding of our "lines in the sand," our allies and enemies should be crystal clear on U.S. actions.
As it turns out, we do have a "Rules of Engagement," a Nuclear Doctrine published for anyone to read. The current rules were released in the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, (Office of The Secretary of Defense, 2018) and the policy remained unchanged in the 2022 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. (Office of The Secretary of Defense, 2022) Both of these documents are public and include the following declaratory policy regarding the potential employment of nuclear weapons:
"The United States would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners. Extreme circumstances could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks. Significant non-nuclear strategic attacks include but are not limited to, attacks on the U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.
The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.
Given the potential of significant non-nuclear strategic attacks, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of non-nuclear strategic attack technologies and U.S. capabilities to counter that threat."
There are a couple of points to take note of:
Nuclear attacks can counter both conventional and nuclear attacks based on severity. It is not limited to the nuclear-only response. Any attack on our early warning, intelligence gathering, command and control, or the weapons themselves would invite nuclear retaliation. (which are covered in Chapter 6 and 7 of my book)
The U.S. reserves the right to conduct a first nuclear strike. That was a change in posture. Until the rise of rogue nuclear powers, North Korea specifically, the U.S. had a no-first-use policy.
Our Allies are covered by the doctrine that we extend a nuclear umbrella over them with all the same rules of engagement we have for ourselves.
A new section was added to the 2018 policy. The U.S. recognized that emerging threats such as cyber, information, biological, or space warfare could be as damaging as conventional or nuclear attacks.
I'm sure the fact that we would risk U.S. security by extending our "nuclear umbrella" to our Allies gives you pause. Why should we do that? The simple answer is to limit nuclear proliferation and lower strategic complexity. It's bad enough that 11 nations have nuclear weapons. From the moment the U.S. exploded the atomic bomb in 1945, our policy was to limit the proliferation of the technology. A country doesn't need nuclear weapons, their risks, or their expense if they have the credible protection of a superpower.
Michael Rühle, department head at NATO's Emerging Security Challenges Division, lays out the realities of U.S. responsibilities to ourselves and to our allies whether we, U.S. citizens, like it or not. "It is moot to speculate whether the United States would indeed be willing to risk nuclear escalation in order to protect an Ally. What counts is the political signal that Washington views the security of its Allies as a fundamental national security interest … the United States remains the linchpin of Western deterrence. This is not just due to their tremendous military power but also their political will to act as a guarantor of global order. Should the U.S. lose this will – or lose its ability to convey it – others would soon test the various "red lines" drawn by Washington." (Rühle, 2015)
The U.S. has clearly defined rules of engagement concerning nuclear weapons release for acts against ourselves or our allies, and in that respect, we have the political will to maintain our nuclear umbrella of protection. Our issue today in this New Cold War is a lack of clearly defined rules with respect to Grey Zone or regional aggression. Tensions in these areas are caught up in bureaucratic and political inertia and debate delaying or eliminating timely responses to de-escalate these lower levels of egress and undermining deterrence.
Final Thoughts
At the time of writing this blog, it is 2 months until Donald Trump becomes the 47th President of The United States. Until then, we can expect not just Russia but China, Iran, and North Korea to maneuver to strengthen their position both militarily and economically to deal with the incoming Trump Administration. The Biden Administration, while having strengthened and broadened ties with our Allies, has, nonetheless, been slow to act and weak in action.
The so-called "Axis of Tyranny," Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, will take whatever advantage of the Biden Administration's weakness during the U.S. transition of power. Our concern during this transition period is that an Axis member(s) overplays their hand and, through miscalculation, starts a full-scale war with the U.S.. Putin certainly seems to be heading in that direction.
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Dystopic: The Technology Behind Today's News
Ukraine War Update to the UK House of Lords:
Official Ukrine war Website:
British Storm Shadow and French SCALP Cruise missiles deployment: https://www.politico.eu/article/joe-biden-storm-shadow-scalp-cruise-missiles-war-in-ukraine-russian-targets-uk-france-weapons/
U.S. / NATO Missile defense systems: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm
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